Is Notice Enough: Mitigating the Risks of Smartphone Data Sharing by Balebako, Rebecca et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is Notice Enough: Mitigating the Risks of 
Smartphone Data Sharing 
REBECCA BALEBAKO 
CRISTIAN BRAVO-LILLO 
LORRIE FAITH CRANOR 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The benefits to using smartphones are increasingly clear to 
consumers. A variety of entertainment and productivity apps, from 
calendars to restaurant reviews to GPS mapping, offer benefits that 
smartphone users find compelling.  Over half of the U.S. mobile 
market now is using smartphones.1 At the same time, apps, platforms, 
and telecommunication carriers are collecting increasing amounts of 
data and transmitting it to other parties. While the benefits of data 
sharing may be clear to smartphone users, the potential risks and 
harms are not as clear.  
Privacy advocates and security researchers have looked at which 
aspects of data collection are the most concerning to users.2  Security 
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experts have found security holes in smartphone platforms and have 
proposed solutions.3 Yet, the literature lacks a holistic analysis of the 
harms, from tangible damages to privacy concerns that can come to 
users as a result of smartphone data collection. This study tries to 
assess the real harms, and the intervention points where policy can 
make a difference by mitigating these harms. In this work, we use 
expert interviews to evaluate the privacy and security harms that 
occur to users due to smartphone data sharing. Based on a series of 
interviews with 20 experts from 10 stakeholder groups, we enumerate 
the major risks to smartphone users from data sharing and the 
solutions proposed to mitigate these risks.  We use the understandings 
gained through these interviews to evaluate current policy efforts. 
Current policy efforts are focused on transparency, and alerting 
smartphone users to data collection practices.  Our work addresses the 
question of whether the notice approach is the right place to focus 
attention. We ask whether the status quo is sufficient, and conclude 
that while current efforts are useful, other areas need more attention.   
In the next section, we provide background on smartphone data 
sharing. In section III, we describe the methodology for performing 
the expert interviews and analyzing the results. In section IV, we 
itemize the harms and concerns identified by the experts, and in 
section V we discuss the interventions that can mitigate these harms. 
In section VI we discuss and synthesize our findings, offering 
suggestions about what risk mitigations public policy can address, and 
how risk communications can be improved. 
                                                                                                                   
465–473 (2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2037373.2037442 (last visited Dec. 15, 2013); 
ADRIENNE PORTER FELT, SERGE EGELMAN & DAVID WAGNER, I’VE GOT 99 PROBLEMS, BUT 
VIBRATION AIN’T ONE: A SURVEY OF SMARTPHONE USERS’ CONCERNS; JAN LAUREN BOYLES, 
AARON SMITH & MARY MADDEN, PRIVACY AND DATA MANAGEMENT ON MOBILE DEVICES 
(2012); Ildar Muslukhov et al., Understanding Users’ Requirements for Data Protection in 
Smartphones, http://lersse-dl.ece.ubc.ca/record/271 (last visited Dec 11, 2013); Jialiu Lin 
et al., Expectation and Purpose: Understanding Users’ Mental Models of Mobile App 
Privacy Through Crowdsourcing, PROC. OF THE 2012 A.C.M. CONF. ON UBIQUITOUS 
COMPUTING 501–510 (2012); Patrick Gage Kelley, Lorrie Faith Cranor & Norman Sadeh, 
Privacy As Part of the App Decision-making Process, PROC. OF THE SIGCHI CONF. ON 
HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 3393–3402 (2013); Serge Egelman, Adrienne 
Porter Felt & David Wagner, Choice Architecture and Smartphone Privacy: There’s a 
Price for That, WORKSHOP ON THE ECON. OF INFO. SECURITY (2012). 
 
3 Michael C. Grace et al., Unsafe Exposure Analysis of Mobile In-app Advertisements, 
PROC. OF THE FIFTH ACM CONF. ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN WIRELESS AND MOBILE 
NETWORKS, 101–112 (2012), http://www.enck.org/pubs/enck-iciss11.pdf (last visited Dec 
15, 2013); Michael Dietz et al., Quire: Lightweight Provenance for Smart Phone Operating 
Systems, arXiv:1102.2445 [cs] (2011), http://arxiv.org/abs/1102.2445 (last visited Dec. 15, 
2013); William Enck et al., A Study of Android Application Security, PROC. USENIX 
SECURITY SYMP. (2011). 
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II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
In this section, we provide a brief background on policy in the 
United States regarding smartphone data collection. We discuss the 
characteristics of smartphones that contribute to data collection risks.  
We describe current smartphone users’ concerns about smartphone 
security and privacy, and describe advice currently being given to 
consumers. We explain how expert interviews can be used to 
understand the actual risks to consumers. 
A. Public Policy 
 
First, we provide an overview of three major attempts to define 
consumer privacy principles before discussing the policies specific to 
mobile devices and smartphones.   
Over 30 years ago, the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) published the Guidelines on the Protection 
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.4  Most of the 
OECD’s eight principles focus on the data collector’s responsibility, 
including limited collection of data, and collection of data limited to 
specified purposes.5 
In 1998, The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released the Fair 
Information Practice Principles (FIPPs). These are a subset of the 
OECD’s principles and focus on the consumer’s role in managing their 
data.6  The principles as defined by the FTC are summarized here. 
 
1. Notice/Awareness: This prerequisite for other rights says 
notices should inform consumers about data collection. 
 
2. Choice/Consent: Consumers should have options about 
data collection. 
 
3. Access/Participation: Consumers should be able to view 
data about themselves and ensure accuracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
4 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD GUIDELINES ON 
THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (1980). 
5 Id. 
 
6 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE, A REPORT TO CONGRESS (2002). 
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4. Integrity/Security: Collectors must take steps to maintain 
accurate data and secure it from unauthorized access. 
 
5. Enforcement/Redress: There must be a means to enforce 
the above rights.7 
 
The first three rights place responsibility on both the consumer 
and the data collector to manage their data and privacy. Data 
collectors should provide notice and choice, while consumers should 
read notices, be aware of their choices, and participate in ensuring the 
data is accurate. Integrity/Security is the only FIPP in which the 
expectations are solely on the data collector. 
In 2012, the White House issued a Consumer Privacy Bill of 
Rights,8 which advanced seven rights for consumers over their 
electronic data. These rights are:  
 
1. Control 
 
2. Transparency 
 
3. Respect for Context 
 
4. Security 
 
5. Access and Accuracy 
 
6. Focused Collection 
 
7. Accountability  
 
These overlap with the FTC FIPPs; all five of the FTC FIPPs are 
represented in the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.9 Transparency is 
similar to notice and awareness, and accountability is similar to 
enforcement and redress. The Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights added 
 
 
 
 
7 Id. 
8 THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK 
FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 
(2012). 
9 Id. at 10-23.  
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two elements.10 One is “Respect for Context,” defined as: “Consumers 
have a right to expect that companies will collect, use, and disclose 
personal data in ways that are consistent with the context in which 
consumers provide the data.” The second is Focused Collection 
defined as: “Consumers have a right to reasonable limits on the 
personal data that companies collect and retain.”11 Like the OECD 
principles, both of these imply that there should be some limit to the 
amount of data collected, based on context and the specific users of 
the data. 
Solove and Hertzog argue that the FTC is the most powerful and 
influential body in privacy jurisdiction, and that notice and choice is 
one of the “most central aspects” of the jurisprudence.12 In 2013, the 
FTC issued a report on Mobile Privacy Disclosures, which included 
specific guidelines that app developers, smartphone platforms, and 
advertising networks could use to improve notice to smartphone uses 
about data collection.13 The FTC has also endorsed “Do Not Track” a 
simplified mechanism allowing consumers to indicate if they wish to 
receive targeted ads.14 
The California Attorney General (CA-AG) issued privacy 
guidelines for several stakeholders in mobile device ecosystem, 
including notice and limiting collection of personally identifiable 
information.15 The CA-AG also threatened to fine app developer that 
collected personal information but who did not provide a privacy 
notice.16 
 
 
 
 
 
10 Id. at 15. 
11 Id. at 21. 
12 Daniel Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014). 
13 FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES, BUILDING TRUST THROUGH 
TRANSPARENCY (2013). 
14 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF ISSUES PRIVACY REPORT, OFFERS FRAMEWORK FOR 
CONSUMERS, BUSINESSES, AND POLICYMAKERS (2010). 
15 CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF JUSTICE & PRIVACY ENFORCEMENT AND PROTECTION UNIT, PRIVACY 
ON THE GO: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MOBILE ECOSYSTEM. 
16 Melissa J. Krasnow, Mobile Application Privacy Policy Enforcement by the California 
Attorney General (2002), http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2012/krasnow11-cyber-
privacy-risk-insurance.aspx. 
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In 2012, the Department of Commerce’s National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) 
launched a multi-stakeholder initiative on Mobile Application 
Transparency.17 This group created a code of conduct for app 
developers that included a standardized short-form privacy notice for 
mobile devices.18 
While most policy efforts have focused on notice, some attention 
has been given to the other privacy principles of security and data 
collection minimization. Both the FTC and the CA-AG have provided 
such advice,19 without describing a means of enforcement. 
Solove describes privacy law’s focus on transparency and control 
as “self-management.”20 He argues that this is problematic, due to 
users’ cognitive and structural limitations.21 The structural limitations 
include the scale of data collection, data aggregation, and users’ 
difficulties in assessing harm.22 Cranor provides an overview of 15 
years of notice and choice initiatives for online privacy, and argues 
that they have not been sufficient to protect users due to lack of 
incentives to participate and the lack of enforcement.23 Ben-Sharar 
and Schneider argue that mandated disclosures in general (not just 
privacy) are ignored or misunderstood.24 Calo recognizes the 
 
 
 
 
17 NAT’L TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADMIN., PRIVACY MULTISTAKEHOLDER PROCESS: MOBILE 
APPLICATION TRANSPARENCY (2013). 
18 Id.  
19 Mobile App Developers: Start with Security | BCP Business Center, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N., http://business.ftc.gov/documents/bus83-mobile-app-developers-start-security 
(last visited Dec 14, 2013); NAT’L TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADMIN., PRIVACY 
MULTISTAKEHOLDER PROCESS: MOBILE APPLICATION TRANSPARENCY (2013). 
20 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 1880 (2013). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 1888-1893. See also, Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and 
Rationality in Individual Decision Making, 3 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 26 (2005); 
Acquisti, Alessandro, & Jens Grossklags, What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us About 
Privacy, in DIGITAL PRIVACY (2007). 
 
23 Lorrie Faith Cranor, Necessary but Not Sufficient: Standardized Mechanisms for 
Privacy Notice and Choice, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 273 (2012). 
 
24 Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. OF 
PENN. L. REV. 647 (2011). 
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problems of typical privacy notices and argues for trying visceral 
notices instead of the standard textual privacy notices.25 
In this work, we use several of the rights or practices described 
above to categorize the harms and interventions suggested by our 
expert interviewees.  In particular we look at notice, choice, security, 
and data minimization.   
B. Privacy and Security on Smartphones 
 
Smartphones have characteristics that distinguish them from 
personal computers (PCs), and impact the harms and concerns from 
data sharing. Smartphones are smaller than PCs, and users tend to 
carry them wherever they go. This allows for a greater chance of loss 
and theft. Smartphone sensors (e.g. microphone or GPS) permit 
increased data collection, which allow inferences about the users’ 
behavior26and increase the possibilities of eavesdropping.27 
Smartphones are a relatively new technology, and many of the security 
and privacy techniques users have learned for PCs do not apply to 
smartphones.28 Smartphones can be susceptible to particular malware 
attacks that use a smartphone’s ability to call premium-rate numbers 
and other direct access to financial information as mobile money 
usage increases.29 Additionally, battery and memory limitations 
reduce the capacity of smartphone security solutions.30 Smartphones 
 
 
 
 
25 M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1027 (2012).  
 
26 Jun Han, Emmanuel Owusu, Thanh-Le Nguyen, Adrian Perrig & Joy Zhang, 
ACComplice: Location Inference Using Accelerometers on Smartphones, PROC. OF THE 
FOURTH INT’L CONF. ON COMM. SYS. & NETWORKS (2012); Roman Schlegel et al., 
SOUNDCOMBER: A STEALTHY AND CONTEXT-AWARE SOUND TROJAN FOR SMARTPHONES 
(2011); Nan Xu et al., Stealthy Video Capturer: A New Video-based Spyware in 3G 
Smartphones, in PROC. OF THE SECOND ACM CONF. ON WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY 69–
78 (2009). 
 
27 Mariantonietta La Polla, Fabio Martinelli & Daniele Sgandurra, A Survey on Security for 
Mobile Devices, 15 IEEE COMM. SURVEYS & TUTORIALS 446–471 (2013). 
 
28  Reinhardt A. Botha, Steven M. Furnell & Nathan L. Clarke, From Desktop to Mobile: 
Examining the Security Experience, 28 COMPUTERS & SECURITY 130–137 (2009). 
29 Reinhardt A. Botha, Steven M. Furnell & Nathan L. Clarke, From Desktop to Mobile: 
Examining the Security Experience, 28 COMPUTERS & SECURITY 130–137 (2009); M. 
Becher et al., Mobile Security Catching Up? Revealing the Nuts and Bolts of the Security 
of Mobile Devices, in 2011 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY 96–111 (2011). 
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also have small screen sizes, which limits the ability to communicate 
complicated ideas or show security icons such as SSL indicators.31 
The major smartphone platforms in the United States are currently 
Google’s Android, and Apple’s iPhone.  Apps for Android are available in 
Google’s app market.  Since 2012, new apps added to the market are 
automatically scanned for malware.32 Apple’s screening of market apps is 
a bit different: Apple requires developers to register for a developer ID 
before submitting apps to their app store, and Apple reviews apps that 
are submitted before allowing them to be available in the app store.33 
Apple and Google rely on the carriers to provide system and 
security updates to their users’ phones.  Recently the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a complaint with the FTC stating that 
the carriers fail to provide prompt updates.34 
On Android phones, the standard privacy notice for apps consists 
of a notification when an app is installed about which permissions the 
app can access. This notification lists which of 130 possible 
permissions, including location and network communication, that the 
app has requested.35 Users may either accept all the permissions and 
install the app, or they may choose to stop the install.  Research on 
Android permissions finds that the current install system is not 
effective in informing users about permissions, due to lack of user 
attention and comprehension.36 Android version 4.3 offered a hidden 
privacy control that allowed users to set granular permissions on apps, 
                                                                                                                   
30 M. Becher et al., Mobile Security Catching Up? Revealing the Nuts and Bolts of the 
Security of Mobile Devices, in 2011 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY 96–111 (2011); 
Mariantonietta La Polla, Fabio Martinelli & Daniele Sgandurra, A Survey on Security for 
Mobile Devices, 15 IEEE COMM. SURVEYS & TUTORIALS 446–471 (2013). 
31 Chaitrali Amrutkar, Patrick Traynor & Paul C. van Oorschot, Measuring SSL Indicators 
on Mobile Browsers: Extended Life, or End of the Road?, in INFO. SECURITY (2012). 
  
32 Hiroshi Lockheimer, ANDROID AND SECURITY GOOGLE MOBILE BLOG, 
http://googlemobile.blogspot.com/2012/02/android-and-security.html (last visited Dec. 
11, 2013). 
 
33 OS X Mavericks - It’s built to Keep your Mac Safe., APPLE, 
http://www.apple.com/osx/what-is/security.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2013). 
 
34 ACLU Android FTC Complaint, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_-
_android_ftc_complaint_-_final.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2013). 
35 Id. 
36 Adrienne Felt et al., Android permissions, PROC. OF THE EIGHTH SYMP. ON USABLE 
PRIVACY AND SECURITY 1–14 (2012); Patrick Gage Kelley, Lorrie Faith Cranor & Norman 
Sadeh, Privacy As Part of the App Decision-making Process, PROC. OF THE SIGCHI CONF. 
ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 3393–3402 (2013). 
. 
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allowing them to disallow specific permissions for installed apps. 
However, this feature was removed in version 4.4, as Google claimed 
it was only released by accident.37 
The iPhone system displays notifications the first time certain 
data, such as location, is accessed by an app. iPhone also includes 
several additional privacy settings.  One setting allows users to control 
whether each app can have access to a short list of permissions, such 
as location and contacts.38  Another setting allows users to “limit ad 
tracking,” which stops sending the phone’s unique id and prevents 
tracking across apps.39 
C. Consumers’ Perception and Advice 
 
Research has also been done to understand users’ perceptions of 
smartphone security and privacy. A Pew Internet Study found that 
smartphone users have concerns about sharing personal information, 
reporting “57% of all app users have either uninstalled an app over 
concerns about having to share their personal information, or 
declined to install an app in the first place for similar reason.”40  
Urban et al. found that 78% of mobile phone users felt the data on 
their mobile phones was at least as sensitive as the data on their home 
computers, and that they were unwilling to share the contact 
information for advertising purposes.41 Chin et al. examined how 
smartphone users perceived security and privacy on their 
smartphones and found that users were concerned with physical theft 
 
 
 
 
37 Peter Eckersley, Google Removes Vital Privacy Feature From Android, Claiming Its 
Release Was Accidental, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ 2013/12/google-removes-vital-privacy-features-android-
shortly-after-adding-them (last visited Dec. 16, 2013). 
38 There are 8 types of data that iOS warns users about and allows them to control: 
location, contacts, calendars, reminders, photos, Bluetooth, microphone, and motion 
activity.  In addition, users are warned if apps request access to social accounts such as 
Facebook or Twitter. 
39 iPhoneHacks, HOW TO MANAGE PRIVACY SETTINGS ON YOUR IPHONE, IPAD, OR IPOD 
TOUCH IN IOS6, http://www.iphonehacks.com/2012/10/ios-6-manage-privacy-settings-
iphone-ipad-ipod-touch.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2013). 
40 Jan Lauren Boyles, Aaron Smith & Mary Madden, Privacy and Data Management on 
Mobile Devices, PEW RESEARCH CENTER: SCIENCE & TECH (Sept. 5, 2012). 
41 Jennifer Urban, Chris Hoofnagle & Su Li, Mobile Phones and Privacy, UC BERKELEY 
PUB. L. RESEARCH PAPER NO. 2103405 (2012).  
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of their data, malware, and wireless network attacks.42 A survey on 
smartphone users’ concerns regarding unauthorized access by 
smartphone apps found that the greatest concerns were contacts being 
deleted, premium text message being sent, or calls to 1-900 
numbers.43 Passwords and GPS tracking information are also 
considered sensitive information.44 These studies are complimentary 
to ours in that they look at user perceptions, while we look at a range 
of expert perceptions. 
Non-profits, government agencies, and media outlets have offered 
advice to smartphone users on protecting their smartphone privacy 
and security. For example, the European Network and Information 
Agency’s advice on smartphone security includes automatically 
locking the smartphone with a password to prevent unauthorized 
access, checking the reputation of apps or services to avoid malware, 
and clearing the phone’s data (“reset and wipe”) before disposing of 
the phone.45 A Forbes.com article advising readers about smartphone 
privacy includes the above advice, as well as updating apps for 
security patches, using smartphone privacy settings to limit location 
tracking and access to other information, and limiting access by 
closing apps when they aren’t being used.46 The Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, a non-profit consumer advocacy group, released a fact 
sheet titled “Privacy in the Age of the Smartphone,” which informs 
readers that criminals, advertisers, and the government all want to 
“snoop” on their smartphone. In addition to protecting the phone with 
a password and researching apps before downloading, the privacy tips 
offered to consumers include contacting carriers to opt-out of data 
collection and advocacy such as writing to their congressional 
representatives to advocate for better laws.47 
 
 
 
 
42 Erika Chin et al., Measuring User Confidence in Smartphone Security and Privacy, 
PROC. OF THE EIGHTH SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY 1–16 (2012). 
 
43 ADRIENNE PORTER FELT, SERGE EGELMAN & DAVID WAGNER, I’VE GOT 99 PROBLEMS, BUT 
VIBRATION AIN’T ONE: A SURVEY OF SMARTPHONE USERS’ CONCERNS (2012). 
44 Ildar Muslukhov et al., Understanding Users’ Requirements for Data Protection in 
Smartphones, http://lersse-dl.ece.ubc.ca/record/271 (last visited Dec. 11, 2013). 
45 GILES HOGBEN & MARNIX DEKKER, SMARTPHONES: INFORMATION SECURITY RISKS, 
OPPORTUNITIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USERS (2010). 
46 Caroline Meyer, Don’t Be Dumb About Smartphone Privacy, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2013/03/05/dont-be-dumb-about-smartphone-
privacy/. 
47 PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, FACT SHEET 2B: PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF THE 
SMARTPHONE (2012). 
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We hope our research will help improve advice to consumers and 
other stakeholders by highlighting the harms and providing solutions 
to reduce the risk of the harms. 
E. Expert Elicitations 
 
Expert elicitations have been used to inform public policy in a 
number of areas, particularly those where the risks are difficult to 
quantify, such as biological invasions by non-native species,48 the use 
of biofuels,49 and other areas investigated by the Environmental 
Protection Agency.50 Expert interviews have also been used in 
computer security. 
Sheng et al. used expert elicitations to determine the risks of phishing 
to users. They interviewed 31 experts on phishing and malware 
prevention using open-ended questions. They looked for recurring 
themes across the experts to synthesize high-level findings about risks 
and options to stakeholders. They identified several places where the 
stakeholder most able to fight phishing had little incentive to do so.51 
Bravo-Lillo et al. interviewed both users with advanced security 
knowledge, and average or novice users about their reactions to 
security warnings.  They found several key differences between 
advanced and novice users. For example, novice users usually decide 
to trust a site or software based on its look-and-feel, while advanced 
users would only use look-and-feel as a warning against trusting a site 
or software. The authors mention the importance of mitigating risks 
where feasible, as opposed to relying on warnings.52 
Expert elicitations have been used to create risk notifications and 
communications. An effective risk communication should focus on 
issues that people at risk need to know but currently ignore.53 Thus, 
 
 
 
 
48 David M Lodge et al., Biological Invasions: Recommendations for U.S. Policy and 
Management, 16 ECOL. APPL. 2035–2054 (2006). 
49 Giulia Fiorese et al., Advanced Biofuels: Future Perspectives from an Expert Elicitation 
Survey, 56 ENERGY POL’Y 293–311 (2013). 
50 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EXPERT ELICITATION TASK FORCE WHITE 
PAPER (2011). 
51 S. Sheng et al., Improving Phishing Countermeasures: An Analysis of Expert 
Interviews, in ECRIME RESEARCHERS SUMMIT, 2009 ECRIME ‘09 1–15 (2009). 
52 Cristian Bravo-Lillo et al., Bridging the Gap in Computer Security Warnings: A Mental 
Model Approach, 9 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 2, 18–26 (2011). 
53 GRANGER MORGAN ET AL., RISK COMMUNICATION: A MENTAL MODEL APPROACH (2001). 
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risk communications should inform the public about the risks of a 
technology based on an understanding of both the actual and the 
perceived risks. Current smartphone notices inform users about data 
sharing, but not about the consequences and actual risks of data 
sharing.54 This suggests that risk communication for smartphone data 
sharing can be improved. 
Morgan et al. outlined a method for creating effective risk 
communication for many areas of public policy. The method focuses 
on one risk at a time, and includes five steps: creating an expert 
model, conducting open-ended mental model interviews, conducting 
structured confirmatory interviews, drafting an appropriate risk 
communication, and evaluating the communication. The authors 
recommend observing the frequency with which new concepts emerge 
with each interview. In most cases, after between 20 and 30 
interviews no new concepts will emerge.55 Similarly, Meyer provides 
guidelines for conducting expert elicitations,56 and Kynn et al. 
discusses how to counter some of the heuristics and biases in expert 
elicitations. For example, experts (and non-experts) tend to be 
overconfident in their estimations.57 
Our study informs the creation of an expert model of the multiple 
risks and harms that may affect smartphone users. In order to find 
those risks that experts agree that lay users face, we used a large pool 
of experts (20) from different backgrounds, and report on those risks 
mentioned by five or more experts. While we believe this approach 
allows for some consistency in identified risks, further work is 
necessary to determine the statistical occurrence of these risks in the 
smartphone ecosystem. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
We interviewed 20 experts on privacy and security from 10 
different stakeholder groups involved in smartphone data sharing. 
The anonymous interviews were typically one hour long. Experts were 
 
 
 
 
54 For example, the Android permission “Internet” is explained with the following text: 
“Allows applications to open network sockets.” One warning for iOS is “[App name] would 
like to use your current location.” 
55 GRANGER MORGAN ET AL, supra note 54. 
56 MARY A. MEYER, ELICITING AND ANALYZING EXPERT JUDGMENT, A PRACTICAL GUIDE 
(2001). 
57 Mary Kynn, The “Heuristics and Biases” Bias in Expert Elicitation, 171 J. ROYAL 
STATISTICAL SOC’Y: SERIES A (STATISTICS IN SOC’Y) 239–264 (2008). 
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not compensated for their time. The interviews were recorded, 
transcribed verbatim, and coded for themes regarding harms, risks 
and interventions.  
A. Stakeholder Selection and Recruitment 
 
In order to get a broad range of opinions and perspectives, we first 
identified ten stakeholder groups from which to select participants. All 
participants were working in privacy or security, and typically had 
experience with mobile or smartphone privacy or security. We 
classified experts based on their current or recent employers as 
follows: 
 
 Academia - Researchers and professors in university or research 
lab settings who conduct research on smartphone security or 
privacy. 
 
 Application Industry - App developers or app industry 
representatives. 
 
 Platform providers - Developers or managers in companies 
building smartphone operating systems or platforms. 
 
 Telecommunications providers - Researchers or managers in 
companies providing telecommunication services. 
 
 Security Experts - Developers or managers in companies 
providing security solutions, or managing the security branches of 
IT companies. 
 
 Aggregator or advertiser - Developers or managers in companies 
aggregating data or providing ads based on smartphone data. 
 
 Consumer advocates – Representative of non-profit agencies 
advocating for consumer privacy. 
 
 Industry - Representatives from online advertising and other 
stakeholder industry associations as well as attorneys who 
represent multiple industry stakeholders. 
 
 Government - Public policy specialists working for federal 
regulatory agencies. 
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 Privacy Industry - Developers or managers in companies 
providing consumer privacy tools. 
 
We looked for experts who had been involved in recent public 
policy efforts on mobile transparency such as the NTIA’s Privacy 
Multi-stakeholder Process on Mobile Application Transparency (NTIA 
MSHP), who had published papers on mobile privacy and security, or 
who had been recommended by other experts. We recruited experts 
using a personalized email, asking them to volunteer one hour to 
participate in the interview on mobile privacy and security. 
Participants were told that they would be anonymous and were not 
expected to represent their employers. We interviewed 20 experts 
representing all of the stakeholders above. Some experts fell into two 
categories, due to the range of their experience and their self-
descriptions. For example, an expert who worked in one field for a 
number of years and then recently switched employers, or an expert 
whose job includes multiple roles, could represent two stakeholder 
groups. For experts who fell into two categories, we use a participant 
id based on which experience was longer (Table 1). 
Ten experts were invited but did not agree to be interviewed, citing 
time constraints (4), constraints due to their employer or profession 
(2), did not provide a reason (1), or did not respond to multiple 
requests (3). These experts represented all of the stakeholder groups, 
except industry and government. Therefore, we feel that there was not 
a stakeholder selection bias in participation. 
 Table 1 gives an overview of the participants and the stakeholder 
they represented.  The experts were typically well-seasoned: 13 
experts had over 15 years of experience, and only two had 5 or fewer 
years of experience. Half (10) of the experts were participants in the 
NTIA MSHP.   
 
ID Stakeholder 
AC1 Academia
AC2 Academia
AC3 Academia
SE1 Security Expert & Academia
SE2 Security Expert & Platform Provider
AD1 Aggregator or Advertiser
AD2 Aggregator or Advertiser & Industry
AP1 Application Industry
AP2 Application Industry
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CA1 Consumer advocate
CA2 Consumer advocate
L1 Industry
L2 Industry
G1 Government
G2 Government
PL1 Platform Provider
PL2 Platform Provider
PI1 Privacy Industry
TE1 Telecommunications Provider & Application 
Industry  
TE2 Telecommunications Provider
Table 1: Participants who were interviewed, including stakeholder 
group. The numbers used in the IDs do not correspond to the order in 
which participants were interviewed. 
 
If the expert agreed to the interview, they were asked to fill out an 
anonymous consent form, as required by Carnegie Mellon University 
Institutional Review Board. The researcher then contacted them by 
phone or in person for a one-hour interview. The experts were all 
advised that they would remain anonymous. All experts were told they 
would be provided with the final report, but they were not given the 
option to modify or change the results. The interviews took place in 
the first quarter of 2013, before the eruption of news regarding 
government surveillance due to the Snowden leaks. 
B. Interview Design 
 
The interviews were “standardized open-ended interviews,”58 also 
known as “semi-structured interviews.” The interview script contained 
ten open-ended questions regarding harms and risks of smartphone 
data sharing, the possibilities for reducing risks, future directions, and 
vulnerable populations. The researcher-interviewer asked clarifying 
questions or detailed questions as needed throughout the interview. 
The interview script is provided in Appendix A. 
Great care must be taken in designing the questions for expert 
elicitations to ensure that experts will be able to interpret them 
 
 
 
 
58 Daniel W. Turner, Qualitative Interview Design: A Practical Guide for Novice 
Investigators, 15 QUALITATIVE REP. 754–760 (2010). 
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correctly. We conducted pilot tests with four graduate students 
involved in privacy and security research. An additional pilot test was 
conducted with a graduate student with experience running expert 
interviews on risks in a different domain (nuclear energy). Finally, we 
shared our interview script with an expert on expert elicitation for risk 
communication to gather feedback on the questions and coding 
methodology. These steps allowed us to refine the interview questions, 
both helping with the flow of questions, the wording of the questions, 
and the amount of time required to complete the interview. 
We designed our questions to be neutral and open-ended. In our 
pilot tests, we found that when interviewees were asked about what a 
user can do to avoid risk, they were able to respond better to a specific 
scenario than a general question. Therefore, we framed the question 
about what the user can do to prevent harms and risks as, “My mother 
recently got a smartphone. What should she do to protect herself from 
the harms we discussed?” Furthermore, our pilot tests indicated that 
experts struggled to rank the harms in terms of likeliness or 
harmfulness. Therefore, we made the question less precise and asked 
the experts to identify which harms were the “most” harmful and the 
“most” likely. 
Despite our attempt to be neutral, some experts were concerned 
that we only asked about the risks or harms of data sharing from 
smartphones, instead of asking about the benefits as well. However, 
our goal was to identify all harms and concerns in a holistic manner, 
so that the appropriate mitigations can be considered, and 
smartphone users can continue to enjoy the benefits of smartphones. 
The same researcher conducted all interviews from February to 
April, 2013. In some interviews a second researcher took notes. Five 
interviews were done in person, in private offices. All other interviews 
were conducted remotely. We recorded the audio of all interviews, 
except for two participants who declined to be recorded. The 
interviewer refrained from offering personal opinions or reacting 
emotionally to responses, and tried to take notes consistently 
throughout the interview. If the interviewer was unclear about a 
response, she tried to re-phrase it neutrally and give the interviewee a 
chance to respond and clarify. 
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C. Results Coding 
 
To code the results, we used “emergent coding” to create a list of 
themes.59 Two researchers independently reviewed the notes and 
transcripts of 15 interviews to create coding sheets for themes. Then, 
they compared the two sets of codes to resolve differences and create a 
consolidated list of themes. A third researcher with experience coding 
expert interviews acted as a moderator to help define the major 
themes. 
One researcher then coded the transcripts using the themes 
identified in the above process. The transcripts were marked to 
identify salient quotes, frequency of comments, and also to identify 
which stakeholders discussed which themes. 
D. Limitations 
 
Qualitative interviews allow for in-depth analysis that cannot be 
obtained through quantitative surveys. However, the small sample 
size necessarily limits the conclusions that can be drawn. We found 
that very few new themes emerged after 15 interviews, regardless of 
the stakeholder.  Therefore, our selection of 20 experts appears to be 
sufficient to get a broad representation of possible harms and 
interventions.  However, it does not provide a large enough sample to 
evaluate differences between stakeholders. In addition, there were 
some themes that emerged in the second half of the interview process 
that inspired additional questions to subsequent participants. We do 
not know how the earlier participants would have responded if asked 
directly about those themes. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to elicit probabilities associated with 
risk when the chances of harms are extremely small, or extremely 
dependent on context. Therefore, we avoided asking for or performing 
quantitative evaluations of risk. 
 
IV. HARMS AND CONCERNS 
 
In this section we describe the risks and harms identified by the 
experts. First, we describe the major themes that were identified. We 
then describe which harms were considered either likely or harmful. 
 
 
 
 
59 JONATHAN LAZAR, JINJUAN HEIDI FENG & HARRY HOCHHEISER, RESEARCH METHODS IN 
HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 281-303 (2010). 
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A. Definition of Data Sharing 
 
As a warm-up question, and to make sure that experts were using 
similar definitions, we began the interview by asking the experts to 
define “data-sharing” from smartphones. Experts typically defined the 
term as data that is sent from the phone to any other party, including 
app developers, phone carriers, the OS or platform providers, and any 
third-parties with whom data is further shared. 
 
Harm Examples # 
Experts 
Social problems 
& 
embarrassment 
Embarrassment, problems with social 
relations, spamming friends, social 
boundaries crossed (employer see 
something they shouldn’t), sensitive data 
being viewed by others, cyber-bullying  
17 
Direct financial 
harm  
Malware, thieves discover house location, 
ID theft, premium texting 
16 
Surveillance & 
monitoring  
Government surveillance, location 
monitoring (whether or not physical 
harm/stalking results), activity 
monitoring 
13 
Privacy concerns  Strangers/enemies find location, sensitive 
data being viewed by someone else, 
identified based on biometrics  
13 
Financial 
discrimination  
Price discrimination, job discrimination, 
insurance discrimination, redlining  
11 
Physical 
harm/stalking 
Strangers find location, stalking, physical 
harm due to location being known, harm 
due to knowledge about physical 
vulnerability 
9 
Behavioral 
advertising 
Unwanted marketing 8 
Resource usage Spam, downloading unwanted software, 
battery drain  
8 
Health 
discrimination 
Medical insurance discrimination, 
discrimination based on disability 
5 
Harm to society  Phone converted to botnet, citizens are 
informed via filter bubble  
4 
 
Table 2: Themes for Harms, Risks, and Privacy Concerns, ordered by 
the number of experts that mentioned them. 
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B. Identifying Harms and Concerns 
 
The goal of the first part of the interview was to brainstorm all the 
possible harms or concerns that could impact a smartphone user. We 
then used follow-up questions to identify which they consider most 
likely or harmful. Some experts expressed reservations with the word 
“harm.” They were particularly concerned about whether “harm” 
included only things could be proven harmful in a court of law. Our 
goal was to open the field so that all possible concerns could be aired. 
We asked experts to consider not just “harms,” but also concerns. 
When one expert said that laws already protect users (such as against 
identity theft), we asked him to discuss what was possible, assuming 
that a lawsuit or other action was less desirable than preventing the 
harm. 
Using emergent coding, we identified several major themes to 
describe the harms or concerns that could impact smartphone users as 
a result of data sharing. These themes are listed in  
Table 2. The examples are those specifically mentioned by experts. 
Experts’ responses included a range of high-level themes, such as 
those in the left column of Table 2, or very specific examples of harms 
and how they are caused. Some themes overlapped with other themes, 
but the examples given for each justified treating them separately. For 
example, physical harm and stalking could also be related to 
surveillance and monitoring, in that stalking implies monitoring. 
However, there were sufficiently different examples in each group. 
Being monitored was described as harm in itself, whether or not it 
leads to a physical attack.60 Physical attacks were a significant concern 
that could result from stalking, but could also occur as a result of other 
types of data releases. 
C. Evaluating Risks of Harms 
 
We asked experts to tell us which of the harms they identified was 
the “most harmful,” and which was the “most likely.” Many experts 
did so, but several experts said that this was difficult as it may depend 
on the context, the user, or a specific scenario. G1 expressed his 
concern as follows: “It ends up not being super helpful to talk about 
what’s most likely and what’s most dangerous because you don’t know 
anybody’s individual situation, and I think there’s a wide diversity of 
situations out there and contexts in which that calculus might 
 
 
 
 
60 See, e.g., Neil Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013). 
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change.” SE2 expressed a concern about quantifying the level of harm 
or risk: “One of the biggest risks in smartphones and data and big data 
is that we don’t fully understand the implications of the data, so the 
harms are un-quantified.” Due to the difficulty in identifying whether 
harms are likely, these experts often identified causes of harms (such 
as being infected by malware or unexpected data sharing) rather than 
harms to the user (such as financial theft) when identifying which was 
the most likely harm.  
D. Likely Harms 
 
When asked to describe likely harms, experts included both the 
harms and causes of harms. We coded the responses into the harm 
themes described above. Five or more experts identified the following 
issues as being likely: 
 
 Infection by malware (10 experts) 
 
 Unexpected or excessive data sharing (8 experts) 
 
 Social problems and embarrassment (5 experts) 
 
Experts identified infection by malware most frequently.  For 
example, L2 described malware with the following examples: “I think 
that there is a real risk that cyber criminals will find ways just as they 
try to phish today. Or for that matter, that foreign governments may 
try to compromise mobile devices and turn them into bot nets. Certain 
malware-based mischief is probably the biggest risk.” Many experts 
identified malware as leading to financial harms to users. Some 
thought malware could also result in other types of harms, such as 
harm to society caused by bot nets (AC1) or resource use caused by 
spam (PL2). 
Two experts said that although malware was currently not that 
frequent on smartphones, they expected malware to increase in the 
future due to financial incentives. SE1 said, “As far as malware goes on 
phones, it’s still a pretty small problem, especially compared to the PC 
malware. However, mobile devices are increasingly ubiquitous. So I 
don’t think anybody’s questioning that it’s gonna be a big problem in 
the future.” 
Eight experts identified unexpected or excessive data sharing as 
likely. This includes data sharing with apps, or with third-parties. PI1 
explained the high probability of data sharing, “The immediate threat 
to look at is the opposite of data minimization by apps right now, in 
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terms of are they collecting only what they need for their particular 
process, or are they taking more data they’re trying to find a secondary 
use for later.” However, some experts said that although this was 
likely, it did not necessarily lead to a direct harm. AP1 said, “The most 
likely is the data sharing with others, but not necessarily leading to 
your identity being stolen.” 
Social problems and embarrassment were described as occurring 
either because of poor user interfaces (UI), or the user not being 
aware of the possible use or re-use of their data. L1 described the poor 
UI problem: “I do think people are inadvertently posting, sharing, 
having trouble with the UI... I’m making decisions to share or not 
share with UIs that aren’t always well designed, and so I may be over-
sharing, either because of social network or just because of posting, 
tweeting, contacting, messaging.” 
E. Harms that could cause the most damage 
 
The most damaging concerns identified by five or more experts 
were: 
 
 Financial (12 experts) 
 
 Physical (5 experts) 
 
 Social Harms (5 experts) 
 
Financial harms, typically resulting from direct financial theft, 
phishing, identify theft, or malware, were identified the most 
frequently as harmful. PL1 expressed this concern: “I believe that the 
one that is most harmful is the direct theft of financial data because 
that has a direct financial impact on the user.” 
Physical harm from stalking or location being known was also 
identified as harmful. AP2 described it, “The most harmful would be 
stalking, leading to ultimate dire consequences.” G2 said, “Stalking 
isn’t that likely but the damages are so great.” 
Social harms covered a range of social issues, from divorce to loss 
of job. Embarrassment also fell into this category. G2 expressed that 
this could fall within a range of very harmful to not harmful, 
“Embarrassment sounds like it should be low on the list but people do 
lose their jobs from information that’s found out, and marriages break 
up and things based on information getting out that people didn’t 
intend to get out. And that happens a lot so … it’s a pretty wide 
spectrum from just small embarrassment to something getting sent 
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that you didn’t want, a picture getting out that you didn’t have out 
there to losing a job or losing out on an opportunity or because 
something got out there that was taken out of context.”61 
 
V. INTERVENTIONS 
 
We were interested in what could be done to prevent the harms 
and concerns described by experts. We identified three groups who 
could help protect the user: smartphone users themselves, app 
developers, and platform or OS developers. Several experts also 
described what the government or regulation could do to mitigate 
harms, and we specifically asked the government stakeholders about 
the role of regulation in mitigating harms. We describe the mitigation 
themes that were mentioned most frequently by experts. 
A. Interventions by users 
 
Five or more experts mentioned each of the following four ways 
smartphone users themselves could mitigate harms.  
 
 Education (17 experts) 
 
 Play on Lighted Streets (15 experts) 
 
 
 Protect the Phone (7 experts) 
 
 Reduce the Phone’s Functionality (5 experts) 
 
Education: Experts suggested that smartphone users need to 
become better educated about a variety of topics including privacy 
settings, how location works, or the data ecosystem. Some experts felt 
users should understand app origin and behavior. AP1 said the entire 
 
 
 
 
61 Some research has been done on embarrassment and regret on social networks such as 
Facebook or Twitter.  See Wang Yang, Gregory Norcie, Saranga Komanduri, Alessandro 
Acquisti, Pedro Giovanni Leon, & Lorrie Faith Cranor, "I Regretted the Minute I Pressed 
Share: A Qualitative Study of Regrets on Facebook," PROC. OF THE SEVENTH ACM SYMP. 
ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY 10 (2011); Manya Sleeper, Justin Cranshaw, Patrick Gage 
Kelley, Blase Ur, Alessandro Acquisti, Lorrie Faith Cranor, & Norman Sadeh, "I Read my 
Twitter the Next Morning and was Astonished:” a Conversational Perspective on Twitter 
Regrets, PROC. OF THE 2013 ACM ANNUAL CONF. ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING 
SYSTEMS 3277-3286 (2013). 
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ecosystem needed to be better understood: “No amount of 
improvement in logical interface, better icons, better information flow 
will prevent the problem, which is that people lack context. Therefore 
even something that fully notifies them – unless they understand its 
implications or what it means – it’s still pointless.”  
Some experts stressed that smartphone users needed to 
understand the risks behind different phone features. AP1 described 
the issue: “The larger question is that if you share, but by sharing you 
put yourself at risk because you shared too broadly, you didn’t 
understand the full complexity of what you’re sharing or how it’s being 
shared, There exists some risks there.” 
Experts stressed that it was the users’ responsibility to educate 
themselves. PL1 said, “You [the smartphone user] have to be smart 
about it and you have to know where the app is coming from and try 
to know as much as possible about what the app is doing.”  
Previous research found evidence of the need for smartphone user 
education. Mylonas et. al investigated users’ awareness of smartphone 
security, and how it impacts their decision-making about app 
downloads. They found that users who are not security-savvy, or are 
unaware of smartphone malware are more likely both to trust app 
repositories and to store personal data in their phones. 62 Thus, the 
need for education for less aware smartphone users becomes 
especially important.  
“Play on the Lighted Streets”: experts frequently mentioned 
that users needed to download only trusted apps or use only trusted 
app stores. We borrow the title of this theme from AC3, who said: 
“The best thing I can tell you is to play on the lighted streets, and by 
that I mean that for the most part, the popular applications are safer 
because they receive more scrutiny.” PL2 also stated, “The first thing 
is ... have some notion of which apps are trusted.”  
Following this advice typically requires that users download apps 
only from well-known brands or manufacturers. PL1 explained, “One 
of the biggest things that I always look for and I always encourage my 
friends to look for is a trusted vendor. If that vendor or manufacturer 
misuses my data, what do they stand to lose?” AP2 echoed that a user 
should rely on well-known brands, such as, “large brand companies 
with reputational risks attached to their name. Usually publicly-traded 
companies, which are traded on the Stock Exchange, or companies 
with a brand name, are more likely to be responsive to consumers and 
 
 
 
 
62 Alexios Mylonas, Anastasia Kastania, Dimitris Gritzalis, Delegate the Smartphone User? 
Security Awareness in Smartphone Platforms, 34 COMPUTERS & SECURITY 47-66 (May 
2013).  
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therefore, easier to trust because press accounts or journalistic 
inquiries about their practices are likely to create more scrutiny of the 
company.”63 
Other advice in this category also included that users should only 
download apps from major app stores. G1 stated, “I think the number 
one thing that she should do, is she should only download apps from 
marketplaces, and really she should only download apps from 
whatever the ... relevant OS marketplace is for her phone.” 
Experts also advised that users only download popular apps that 
have been downloaded many times before. APL1 said, “So when you’re 
installing apps, try not to be like the first one to install an app.” AP1 
advised reading the app store reviews, “So be cognizant of the reviews, 
what the number of stars are. Simple things like that can at least help 
to some degree. Is it a solution? No… Does it mitigate? Yes.” 
Protect the Phone: Protecting the phone involves installing 
protective software or physically safeguarding the phone, typically 
against the phone being stolen or physically intercepted. AC1 said, 
“The types of precautions is to guard physical control of the phone and 
to think of it as just as sensitive as your computer, and that means you 
put a password on it and you don’t leave it lying around for your 
suspicious father to search through.”  
Suggested software protections include a remote finder in case the 
phone is lost, setting a secure phone password, using a password 
manager with encryption, using secure VPN, setting up a remote wipe, 
and backing up the phone’s data. 
However, G1 cautioned that this type of protection was not 
sufficient, “PINS and passwords are not going to be guaranteed 
security against a really determined criminal or guaranteed security 
against law enforcement when they’re trying to access your device, but 
they’re like door locks. They keep honest people honest, and keeping 
honest people honest can be really helpful when many privacy risks 
come from people you know.” 
Reduce the Phone’s Functionality: Experts mentioned 
specific functionality that should be turned off in order to reduce data 
sharing. These included turning off Bluetooth (AC2 and SE2), location 
(AC2), using airplane mode (L1), network settings (SE2), and avoiding 
public Wi-Fi networks (SE2, AP2). Turning off these functions may 
 
 
 
 
63 There is some evidence supporting experts’ intuition. See for example Rahul Telang & 
Sunit Wattal, An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Software Vulnerability 
Announcements on Firm Stock Price, 33 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENG’G 544-557 
(Aug. 2007).  
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limit the usability of the phone for certain apps or usages, but it also 
limits the data being sent, or limits when or where it is transmitted.  
SE2 described how a smartphone user could protect herself: “She 
should take a look at the network settings and disable anything she 
doesn’t use... For example, if she has no intention of using a Wi-Fi 
network, turn off Wi-Fi. There’s no reason to have it on.” AP2 said, 
“She probably should not use a public Wi-Fi network when sending or 
transmitting any sensitive information.”   
One example of this is that brick-and-mortar stores are currently 
using public Wi-fi to track their shoppers’ movements indoors, often 
without their knowledge or permission.  The advice the popular press 
has given to those who wish to avoid this is to, “turn their phone off 
and take the battery out.”64 
Nothing: Four experts expressed concern that there wasn’t much 
the user could do to prevent the harms discussed. While this was not a 
frequent theme, we mention this issue as an important concern. G1 
said, “In terms of mitigating the risk, reducing the risk, attempting to 
prevent the risk... There’s a bunch of stuff she can do. But in terms of 
actually outright preventing the risk, get rid of the Smartphone.” CA2 
expressed concerns about the data sharing ecosystem, “It’s gonna be 
very hard to escape the system. Almost impossible.” All four of these 
experts did suggest at least one of the interventions mentioned above 
in addition to expressing skepticism that real protection was possible.  
B. Interventions by App Developers 
 
Five or more experts identified each of the following ways app 
developers could mitigate harms. 
 
 Transparency (15 experts) 
 
 Best Security Practices (8 experts) 
 
 Priority (7 experts) 
 
 Data Minimization (6 experts) 
 
 Understand Third Party Libraries (5 experts) 
 
 
 
 
 
64 Lee Jae-Won, Retail Stores Track Consumers’ Smartphones through Wi-Fi, RT (July 15, 
2013), http://rt.com/business/smartphone-us-store-wifi-112/. 
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 Customer Relationship (5 experts) 
 
 
Transparency: Fifteen experts mentioned that app developers 
needed to be more transparent about their data sharing practices 
through disclosures to users. This included disclosing the purpose of 
the data collection. G2 said app developers should disclose, what data 
they’re collecting for themselves and what data they’re planning on 
collecting and sharing for other purposes.” This was echoed by AP2 
and PL10, who were concerned about what data was being collected, 
why it was being collected, and with whom it was being shared.  
SE2 felt transparency would address privacy concerns by 
removing surprises, “I have a hunch that the majority of people’s 
concern about privacy on the web and on smartphones has to do with 
the lack of transparency. They just don’t know what’s going on, so 
when they find out it’s a surprise ‘cause they assumed it wasn’t.”   
The CA-AG has also been addressed this mitigation in the 
recommendation for app developers to, “Develop a privacy policy that 
is clear, accurate, and conspicuously accessible to users and potential 
users.” 65  
Ten experts also mentioned concerns about the efficacy of 
transparency.  They felt transparency would not be effective if users 
were not interested in nor had the time to learn about or read privacy 
policies.  When discussing privacy notices, AD2 stated that many 
consumers would reject notices, “They don’t want a bunch of 
disclosures and notices and stuff that either they don’t understand or 
they don’t particularly care about.  I think there is a percentage of 
people who do care a lot about that [...] [b]ut I think the majority of 
people don’t want to click through all that stuff.” G1 had a similar 
statement, “there is always going to be either a majority or a super 
majority of these folks who simply aren’t going to read the stuff and 
aren’t going to take the time to compare anyway.” AC2 stated a similar 
concern about balancing the right amount of information on small 
screens with consumers’ limited attention, “This is a tension for us, as 
user interface designers too, which is we can put in a lot of nuance in 
terms of what's going on, but how much will people actually read?”  
CA1 put it bluntly, “I don’t know what [a link to a privacy policy] gets 
you because no one reads the damn things.” 
 
 
 
 
65 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & PRIVACY ENFORCEMENT AND PROTECTION UNIT, 
PRIVACY ON THE GO: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MOBILE ECOSYSTEM (2013).  
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Best Security Practices: Eight experts said app developers 
should be following known best security practices. SE2 posited that 
secure code was the foundation for protecting users’ privacy and 
security: “If you don’t have a secure application you can’t guarantee 
privacy at all. It’s impossible. If I write the most awesome privacy 
preserving software... there’s a bug in my code and somebody can 
exploit my software and make it eavesdropable, ...that’s completely 
useless. So I think building secure code is the foundation of all privacy 
and data control.”  Examples of secure code given by experts include 
using SSL and proper encryption of data. 
There are resources for app developers on developing best security 
practices.  These include guidelines on mobile web from a standards 
consortium,66 and guidelines for each platform from the platform 
developers.67 
AP1, an app developer, recommended that app developers create a 
privacy policy as part of best practices, “In fact, the generation or 
creation of a privacy policy is something that often leads to more 
insight about your product. The developer might view the creation of a 
privacy policy as something for his customers, but in fact its real value 
is for himself and his developer team, or herself and her developer 
team." 
Priority: Seven experts said that app developers may not make 
privacy and security a priority, but they should. Some explained this 
as a lack of resources. For example, PL1 said, “[App developers] are 
working with very few resources and they’re trying to develop complex 
applications in very short time frames in order to try to make some 
money.”  
AC1 had a similar explanation, “I think often privacy and security 
is one of the things they plan to do. It’s on a later day, and their 
primary or their first order of concern is to get a running app that does 
something valuable, and they’re gonna think about things like privacy 
and security much later, perhaps when they make money or otherwise 
are more successful.” 
Through interviews with and surveys of app developers, Balebako 
et. al found app developers did not prioritize privacy and security, and 
 
 
 
 
66 Mobile Web Application Best Practices, W3C Recommendation (Dec. 14, 2010), 
http://www.w3.org/TR/mwabp/. 
67 Guidelines for iOS developers are available at from Apple at “Introduction to Secure 
CodingGuide,”https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/Security/Concept
ual/SecureCodingGuide/Introduction.html; Guidelines for Android developers are 
available at “Best Practices for Security and Privacy,” http://developer.android.com/ 
training/best-security.html. 
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found in particular that smaller app companies were less likely to 
exhibit  privacy and security best practices.68 
Data Minimization: Five stakeholders, including both of the 
app developer stakeholders, discussed the need to minimize the data 
that was collected. SE2, a lawyer, put it succinctly, “Don’t ask for 
privileges you don’t need. It’s a liability.” AP1, an app developer, said, 
“If the developer or the application or the carrier isn’t collecting the 
information, then no potential security risk exists if the information is 
leaked because there’s nothing to leak. That often is referred to as data 
minimization. Data minimization is a way to use privacy to try to 
enhance security. If I don’t have it, I can’t leak it.” 
Understand Third-Party Libraries: Five experts discussed 
that app developers often use third-party libraries, Application 
Programmer Interfaces (APIs), and code toolkits. App developers 
should reveal to users what data is collected by these third parties, but 
they often do not, in part because developers themselves may not 
know what information is being collected by this code. G1 said, “App 
developers really need to be aware. And some app developers weren’t 
really good at this and some don’t give it a second thought.... When 
they are using widgets or modular pieces of code or third-party 
services in order to provide portions of their app, that they need to 
pass on those disclosures concerning those which are modular pieces 
of code and third-party services to the users.” 
L2 felt that third-parties had a responsibility to disclose their data 
collection practices. “It would be good for third parties who collect a 
lot of information through apps to put up a kind of standardized 
notice so information can be sent along and populate the little short 
privacy notice that ideally the mobile apps will provide.” Other experts 
thought that app developers maintained responsibility for 
understanding third-party code. Balebako et. al found  that app 
developers did not always read or understand the terms of service or 
privacy policies of the companies or tools they used.69 
Customer Relationship: Five experts said that app developers 
need to understand the role of privacy and security in their customer 
relationships. Often, this was tied to the need for transparency. PL1 
said, “App developers need to understand that users will partly choose 
 
 
 
 
68 REBECCA BALEBAKO, ABIGAIL MARSH, JIALIU LIN, JASON HONG & LORRIE FAITH CRANOR. 
THE PRIVACY AND SECURITY BEHAVIORS OF SMARTPHONE APP DEVELOPERS (Workshop on 
Usable Security 2014). 
 
69 Id. 
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to use their app or not use their app based on whether they trust them. 
And they need to make sure that they do the right things in order for 
users to trust them. So a lot of that, again, comes down to being 
upfront with the user in terms of what an application is doing and 
why.” G2 stated that app developers, unlike the platform developers, 
have a more direct relationship with the user and therefore had 
increased responsibilities to be transparent, “because app developers 
have a direct relationship with users. They need to be able to utilize 
that direct relationship. So, especially when they’re dealing on the 
sensitive data, financial apps, kids’ apps.” 
AP1 emphasized that this is more an issue of trust than privacy: 
“Trustworthiness is a category under brand, and so having an 
educated populace that sees your product as more trustworthy 
because it provides either better control or limits stuff. You never ever, 
ever will ever make money selling privacy.”  
 
C. Interventions by Platform Developers 
 
Several themes emerged when we asked experts what platform 
developers or OS providers should be doing to protect the smartphone 
user from harm. Typically, platform or OS developers are also app 
store providers. 
 
 Transparency (17 experts) 
 
 Improve User Interface Control (10 experts) 
 
 Security Improvements (7 experts) 
 
 Work with App Developers (6 experts) 
 
Transparency: Seventeen experts argued for more transparency 
about data sharing from platform developers. Three experts were 
concerned about location sharing (AC1, L1 and G2). L1 suggested that 
location should have a notification every time it was shared. L1 was 
also concerned about sharing the phone’s unique id. 
Suggestions for improving transparency in the user interface 
included the app store and the operating system itself. Two experts 
suggested just-in-time notifications (AP1 and CA1). AC3 also 
discussed the need to develop notifications for smaller mobile devices. 
“You can’t just take what kind of works from the desktop, throw it on 
to the platform with totally different visual characteristics and pretend 
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that it’s going to work. It doesn’t even work for expert users. What 
hope do regular users have?”  
However, many experts expressed doubt about whether users 
want additional notices, and whether users would be willing to read or 
learn enough to understand them. P19 said, “It’s probably a good 
practice to allow consumers access to that information when they 
want it but not in a way that undermines the experience of the app 
itself. People come to the app to use the app, not to read about a 
bunch of information practices that really won’t impact them.” 
Improve User Interface Control: Ten experts suggested that 
platforms should improve the privacy and security controls in the user 
interface (UI). Two experts said that both a simple set of controls and 
a more fine-grained set of controls should be available. SE2 explained, 
“The OS vendors have to be really careful to provide for the people 
that don’t wanna think about it by securing things as best they can by 
default. Then provide the cues for people who wanna dig into it a little 
bit and maybe make a more informed risk decision.” 
Three experts said they would like to see a “do not track” setting 
implemented, or that they believed it would be implemented, although 
one was concerned that do not track was still not defined.70  
Security Improvements: Seven experts said that platforms 
should also implement security best practices. These best practices 
were considered to be well known, but some experts offered specific 
advice. SE2 said, “OS developers can protect their software that 
they’re building and figure out what people want for security and 
privacy and do that by default.” G1 suggested remote wiping: “The 
remote wiping is a use case that happens all the time, and it’s 
something that third-party apps provide.” AC1 mentioned the need to 
push out security updates: “So many Android phones are in an 
insecure state because the carriers aren’t pushing out OS updates.”71 
Eight experts mentioned that finding and removing malware from 
app stores was an important part of platforms’ role in protecting 
users. For example, AC2 said, “One thing they could do is try to find 
this malware faster or do better testing and all, and I know they are 
trying to do that too.” AC3 said, “All of the markets, the major 
 
 
 
 
70 The W3C web standards body has a working group chartered to define Do-Not-Track for 
the web, which has been on-going since 2011. See W3C, “Tracking Protection Working 
Group,” http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/. 
71 See ACLU Android FTC Complaint, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_-
_android_ftc_complaint_-_final.pdf (last visited Dec 15, 2014). 
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markets, are pretty vigilant in keeping the absolute worst stuff out and 
they have strong financial incentives to do that.” 
Work with App Developers: Six experts said that platforms 
should provide app developers with tools and education to enable 
improved privacy and security. Stakeholders said that solutions could 
include more example code for security (AC3), making it easier to 
implement security features such as Secure Socket Layer (a method 
for enabling encryption) (AC2), better toolkits (AC2), a security 
checklist (AC2), and enabling app developers to be transparent (SE2) 
by giving them tools to let users know about apps’ data requirements. 
The platform industry stakeholders agreed with this. PL1 said, “I 
think one thing that we can do as an industry is make it easier for 
developers to secure their applications and give them tools and 
libraries to do that, because if we expect developers to put in the time 
and the effort necessary in order to create their own security, they’re 
often going to mess it up. Or in most cases, honestly, they just won’t 
do it at all because they don’t have the time to and they don’t have the 
incentives to.” PL2 said, “Every app developer should be doing privacy 
by design. But I think realistically, the other players have more 
resources to raise privacy awareness... than the app developers.” 
AP2 said that responsibility needed to be shifted from just the app 
developers to the platforms as well, “Shared responsibility would 
lessen the burdens on apps, and actually would assign responsibility 
for developing private tools and notices, and helping educate 
consumers, and helping consumers achieve the goals that they set out 
to when they use the phone. [This is] better than leaving all the 
responsibilities for app developers themselves. And so I consider it a 
systemic failure that we’re all experiencing right now.” 
Nothing: Only one participant thought platforms had no room 
for improvement. AD2 said “I think actually in some ways that they’re 
more restrictive than they could be with respect to data sharing in a 
way that undermines competition and probably limits offerings to 
consumers.” 
D. Role of Government 
 
Seven experts said the government can aid in mitigating risks and 
harms, and five of them brought up government intervention without 
being explicitly asked about government’s role. However, not all 
experts were asked about the role of the government; this theme 
emerged naturally through the interviews.  The interviewer 
specifically asked the government stakeholders what they perceived as 
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government’s role in mitigating risk, but other interviewees were not 
asked.  
The two government representatives, G1 and G2, thought that any 
policy should be sensitive to company needs and innovation. G2 said 
that the government should “promote ways for companies to work 
together to come up with good practices. It helps the marketplace in 
general and trying to convince companies that working together to do 
that with government is gonna be more successful than just hearing 
about these cases of the bad actors.” G1 was concerned about how to 
set up regulation that did not stifle innovation, “So government has to 
walk a really fine line as it does in many areas in terms of technology 
between imposing responsibilities to ensure that consumers are 
protected, while at the same time promoting innovation in the space.” 
Suggestions from other stakeholders included new regulation, 
promoting best practices, intervening when companies do not meet 
security best practices, working internationally, and developing 
standardized notices. CA2, a consumer advocate and participant in the 
NTIA process, described the NTIA MSH goal: “To develop a code of 
conduct or mobile apps to cover so-called transparency. Which is a 
very limited approach and only is one.”  CA2 also felt that, “What’s 
needed is the FTC to promulgate regulations and legislation passed by 
Congress to empower users to opt in to all this data collection and 
use.”   
One stakeholder (TE1) expressed concern that the legislative 
process did not allow the time or communication needed to 
understand the technical details and create a quality standard. This 
stakeholder emphasized that self-regulation efforts within industry 
allowed the companies to “get technical input and to really get into the 
nitty-gritty of the words and what they mean in a way that’s 
impossible in a legislative environment.  You know, [in a legislative 
environment] you might have one meeting with the bill sponsor that 
you can maybe make one point.  You can’t wordsmith a document… 
So it’s just unlikely to be timely and effective when it’s done through 
legislation.” 
Several stakeholders felt that policy should not be focused on app 
developers but on other stakeholders, such as data brokers, platforms, 
and app stores.  AP2 wanted to see limitations on data and collection 
and use by data brokers and advertisers, saying, “while we spend a lot 
of time publicly debating what apps should be doing, we’ve spent 
almost no time discussing and debating limitations on those other 
entities and their data usage.”  AC1 specifically supported the 
California Attorney General’s approach in attempting to “police the 
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elephants – the carriers – rather than all the little mice who are 
making these apps.” 
Many of the experts we interviewed were at the time of the 
interview participating in a government led process, the NTIA MSHP 
on mobile transparency. Therefore their views are likely somewhat 
reflective of their opinions on that process. There is likely a correlation 
between participating in a government process on mobile 
transparency and believing that government processes can be useful 
but difficult. 
E. Vulnerable Populations 
 
In order to understand whether specific interventions are needed 
for different groups, we asked experts what populations are most 
vulnerable to harms from smartphone data sharing. We also asked 
experts whether any of the harms discussed were different for 
children. Most agreed that harms were different for children. As PL1 
said, “Adults are generally more aware of the long-term implications 
of their actions, whereas children don’t necessarily have that same 
level of awareness. AC1 and AD1 said that teenagers might be more 
sensitive to social embarrassment or bullying. PL2 said that children 
might not be as vulnerable to financial exploitation since they have 
fewer financial resources. Obtaining parental consent was discussed 
as a difficulty for apps. Several experts mentioned that parents were 
also vulnerable to mistakes made by their children while using their 
parent’s phone. 
We also asked if there were any vulnerable populations besides 
children. Thirteen experts cited the elderly, but some noted that not 
all elderly are vulnerable. Experts mentioned that some elderly may be 
less technologically savvy, may have trouble seeing small screens, or 
may have trouble manipulating small devices. Notice and choice 
interventions may need to take into account such needs. 
Other vulnerable populations mentioned were: battered women, 
mentally or emotionally disabled, visually disabled, those living in 
countries without due process, members of the military who would be 
at greater risk if their location was revealed, those in financial 
situations where they can’t purchase apps without advertising or 
technological protections, groups that were not previously exposed to 
personal computers and the associated technologies, those with 
language barriers (e.g. non-English speaking in the US), and 
minorities who could be unfairly targeted for unhealthy or undesirable 
products. 
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F. Interventions and the Privacy Principles 
 
We looked at how the interventions discussed by experts related to 
the FTC’s Fair Information Practice Principles.72 Several interventions 
are related to the notice and choice principles. Security was also 
frequently mentioned as an intervention. Experts did not frequently 
mention the other two principles: participation and enforcement. In 
addition to notice, choice, and security, data minimization was also 
mentioned. Data minimization is not part of the FTC’s principles, 
although it is part of other sets of fair information principles, 
including the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data.73 The security principle 
described by the FTC focuses on preventing unauthorized parties from 
accessing data, while data minimization includes reducing the amount 
of data collected, even by authorized parties. Some experts stated that 
data minimization is a part of security best practices. We highlight 
data minimization as a separate category as experts found it to be an 
important intervention.  
Table 3:  Interventions grouped by who is responsible and whether 
it will lead to improved notice, control, security, or data minimization. 
Principles Interventions
By users By app 
developers 
By platform 
developers 
Notice  Education  Transparency 
 Customer 
relationship 
 Transparency 
 
Control   Improve 
control 
Security  Protect phone 
 Play in the 
lighted streets 
 Best security 
practices 
 Prioritize 
security and 
privacy 
 Understand 
APIS 
 Security 
 Work with 
app 
developers 
Data 
minimization 
 Reduce 
functionality 
 Data 
minimization 
 Understand 
APIs 
 
 
 
 
72 FED. TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE 
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE, A REPORT TO CONGRESS (2002). 
73 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD GUIDELINES ON 
THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (1980). 
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We further explain the categorizations below. Some interventions 
fall into several categories. For example, app developers making 
privacy and security a priority could lead to improved notice, control, 
and data minimization. Making privacy and security a priority is a 
prerequisite for most of the other interventions, and recognizing the 
importance of customer relationships is an incentive to improve 
privacy and security. 
Notice: Notice about data sharing can be improved through 
transparency, education, or standard notices. Notice may lead to 
improved user decision-making. Users who educate themselves are 
paying attention to notices and other available information, and can 
make more informed choices about the data they share. App 
developers and platforms have a role in improving transparency and 
providing better notices.  
Notices should go beyond stating what data was shared, and 
should include purpose and secondary uses, and also take into 
account third-party libraries.  Several experts said notices about data 
collection should include why data is collected and with whom it will 
be shared.  Notices providing this information can help to reduce 
surprise from unexpected data sharing and embarrassment caused by 
data sharing, while also helping users understand why some data uses 
are necessary. Including notices about the data practices of third-
party libraries will help insure that the notices provided by apps are 
complete. Platform providers should provide tools that will assist in 
conveying notices in a standardized format. 
We also recommend user education about malware.  The greatest 
risks come to users from malware.  Some experts indicated that users 
should use only apps from well-known companies, but this may 
discriminate against legitimate but less well-known companies. 
Smaller app companies may desire a way to indicate trustworthiness.  
While the major platforms are taking steps to scan their app markets 
for malware, there may be room for a notice or indication that an app 
has been scanned and can be trusted. 
Control: Control over data sharing can be improved by making 
existing controls more usable and by adding additional controls. 
While control does not necessarily imply notice – it is possible to add 
control through new interfaces that users don’t see or don’t 
understand – we assume that control options would be well 
implemented and usable, and that the user understands the control 
mechanisms.  
Platforms could provide better control, allowing users to make 
decisions according to their privacy and security preferences. This 
could mitigate privacy concerns, stop location monitoring (which can 
314 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 11:2 
 
lead to stalking or physical harm), allow users to turn off behavioral 
advertising, and control resource usage.  
Security: Two user interventions can improve security: 1) users 
can protect the phone so that others will have less access to it or the 
information within, and 2) playing on the lighted streets could result 
in fewer malware downloads, and data shared with fewer malicious 
third-parties. Many of the app developer mitigations, including best 
security practices, data minimization, and understanding APIs, can 
improve security. This in turn can reduce the risks of data reaching 
unintended audiences, reducing harms such as physical harm, 
surveillance, financial harm, and social problems. Platforms can work 
with app developers to improve security practices. Security in the 
platform or app store could lead to less malware, fewer data breaches, 
less unencrypted data transmittal, and fewer coding mistakes that 
allow unintended transmission of data. Therefore, security can 
mitigate the most harmful risks. 
Data Minimization: Data minimization requires sending, 
collecting, and storing the minimum amount of information that is 
needed. When users choose to reduce functionality, they will trade 
some usability or functionality in order to share less information, 
which minimizes the data shared. Data minimization also addresses 
many of the same harms as security. If there is less data to transmit 
and protect, there is less chance of unauthorized access. If the 
authorized data collector’s purpose in collecting data is to profile and 
to make decisions about the consumer, financial and health 
discrimination may result. Reducing collected data may help prevent 
the discrimination, as there is less information to create profiles. 
 
VI. LINKING THE MITIGATIONS TO THE HARMS 
 
In this section, we analyze the relationship of the risks and harms to 
each of the FIPPs discussed above. We classify how the harms identified 
by the experts can be mitigated through notice, control, security, or data 
minimization.  As Table 4 shows, most harms are not mitigated through 
notice or control alone, but require security and data minimization.  We 
explain these classifications and provide examples. 
The harms that can be mitigated by notice alone – social problems 
and embarrassment, or privacy – tend to be highly personal.  In these 
cases, users can reduce the risk of harm by changing their behaviors, 
such as not installing an app, or not posting information. In these 
cases, notice of the data sharing or collection may suffice and may be 
the only appropriate mechanism.  
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Other harms can be mitigated if users have both notice and control 
over the data collection or sharing.  In these cases, notice is an 
important pre-condition for control, but the control itself allows the 
user to make the decision that mitigates the risk.  For example, users 
may be able to specify with whom data is shared through a control.  
We illustrate this through the scenario of a woman who is concerned 
that an abusive ex-partner will stalk her if he has access to location 
information.  She could share her location with friends who might be 
concerned about her, but could disallow the abusive ex-partner from 
accessing the location information.   In this example, control allows 
the user to apply their personal or situational information to mitigate 
harms, while still taking advantage of the benefits of information 
sharing. 
Some risks cannot be addressed by notice and control.  In these 
cases, there may be a malicious party, or a party motivated to act 
against the interest of the user.  The malicious party may circumvent 
notice and choice, deliberately hiding their access to information or 
preventing the user to control the data sharing.  For example, a party 
that is interested in causing financial harm to the user will try to do so 
in a way that the user cannot control through notice or control.  
Similarly, discrimination is not likely to be an explicit option from 
which users can opt-out.  In these cases, users are not able to mitigate 
the harm. As most app developers are not trained in security and 
privacy74 and are thus unlikely to put much effort in implementing 
security or privacy features, platform developers are probably in a 
better position to protect users as long as this protection does not 
encourage users to switch to other platforms (as it may happen if 
users felt annoyed by added, unusable privacy or security interfaces). 
Hence, these harms should be mitigated through security (not 
allowing malicious users to get access to the information by protecting 
the data with encryption), or data minimization (not creating or 
storing data). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 BALEBAKO ET AL., supra note 68.  
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 Notice Control Security Data 
minimization 
Social Problems 
and 
Embarrassment 
X X X X 
Privacy 
Concerns 
X X X X 
Behavioral 
advertising 
X X X 
Surveillance 
and Monitoring 
X X X X 
Physical harm  X X X 
Stalking  X X X 
Harm to society  X X 
Direct financial 
harm 
 X X 
Financial 
discrimination 
 X 
Resource Usage  X 
Health 
discrimination 
 X 
 
Table 4: Harms mitigated by notice, control, security, or data 
minimization.  In cases where both notice and control are needed, we 
show control as a mitigation, as notice alone would not suffice. 
 
We classify discrimination as being mitigated only by data 
minimization, we assume the party collecting the data is motivated by 
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interests that contradict the smartphone owners’ best interest, 
resulting in a possible harm. Price discrimination may result in 
corporate profit but consumer loss. Security won’t protect the user, as 
the party that causes harm may have unmitigated access to 
information, regardless of best security practices protecting the data 
from access from other parties. Price or product discrimination is 
likely to be perceived as harmful even by users who wish to receive 
targeted ads. For example, in September 2000 an Amazon’s customer 
discovered that if he removed the cookies in his computer, he obtained 
consistently a lower price for a DVD that was offered to him.75   
If users are informed about behavioral advertising, they can use 
various tools to opt-out of advertising76. In those cases in which users 
do not want to receive targeted ads and are not given a mechanism to 
opt out of data collection, data minimization is the remaining 
mitigation option. 
To summarize, notice alone may help mitigate harms only in 
situations in which users have control.  Notice and control can be 
helpful to mitigate harms in the cases when there is not a malicious 
party who is motivated to circumvent notice and choice. 
 
VI. WHY IS PUBLIC POLICY FOCUSED ON TRANSPARENCY? 
 
In previous sections we argued that in some common scenarios, 
harm to users cannot be mitigated by notice and choice alone: in those 
cases the amount of data collection should be minimized, and access 
to collected data by second or third parties should also be reduced.  
Six experts recommended that app developers implement best 
security practices for protecting user data, and seven experts 
suggested that platforms implement security practices such as 
pushing system updates to users frequently and monitoring the app 
stores for malware. Five experts specifically mentioned that app 
 
 
 
 
75 Web sites change prices based on customers’ habits, CNN LAW CENTER (June 24, 2005), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/LAW/06/24/ramasastry.website.prices/.  
76 Some work has found that these tools could be more usable and clear to users.  See Pedro 
Giovanni Leon, Blase Ur, Rebecca Balebako, Rich Shay, Yang Wang & Lorrie Faith Cranor, 
"Why Johnny Can't Opt Out:” A Usability Evaluation of Tools to Limit Online Behavioral 
Advertising, ACM PROC. OF COMPUTER HUMAN INTERACTION (2012).  Other work has 
investigated whether the existing notifications are effective, finding that the current 
AdChoices icon could be improved.  See Pedro Giovanni Leon, Justin Cranshaw, Lorrie 
Faith Cranor, Jim Graves, M. Hastek, Blase Ur, G. Xu, “What Do Online Behavioral 
Advertising Privacy Disclosures Communicate to Users?” WORKSHOP ON PRIVACY IN THE 
ELECTRONIC SOC’Y (WPES) (2012). 
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developers minimize the data collected.  While most experts also 
identified transparency and notice, either by app developers or 
platforms, as a necessary mitigation, ten experts also discussed the 
concerns about relying on notice and the difficulty in getting user 
attention on privacy policies. The question then becomes why public 
policy is currently focusing on notice and choice, as opposed to 
mitigating the most risks through security and data minimization.77  
There seem to be three reasons that policy currently focuses on 
transparency. These are: transparency is perceived as easy to 
implement, transparency is perceived as a non-technical issue, and 
transparency shifts the responsibility on the user.   We discuss each of 
these below. 
The NTIA MSHP chose to address transparency as the first 
consumer privacy protection, as it was perceived as “discrete enough 
to be addressed in a reasonable period of time.”78  This indicates that 
designing alerts to users about data usage and sharing is perceived as 
the low-hanging fruit. However, this may also indicate an ongoing lack 
of awareness of the need for user studies and designing for 
understanding.  Indeed, the NTIA MSHP did create a code of conduct 
with recommended user messages, but the usability of these messages 
was shown to be lacking.79 In 2002 the director of the Bureau of 
Consumer Protection highlighted the need to develop privacy notices 
that could be understood by users.80 Eight years later, the FTC still 
complained about privacy notices being “incomprehensible.”81  
Therefore, we are concerned that the perception that transparency is 
an easy problem to address may be misplaced. 
 
 
 
 
77 For this analysis, we assume that the policy-makers are interested in protecting the 
consumers, and don’t have vested interest in insecure data collection.  While this 
assumption may not hold for some governmental bodies, such as the NSA, we believe this 
to be true for the branches of administration, such as the FTC, that have been investigating 
smartphone privacy. 
78 Lawrence E. Strickling, Putting the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights into Practice 
(2012), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2012/putting-consumer-privacy-bill-rights-practice 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2013). 
79 Rebecca Balebako, Richard Shay & Lorrie Cranor, Is Your Inseam a Biometric? A Case 
Study on the Role of Usability Studies in Developing Public Policy WORKSHOP ON USABLE 
SECURITY (2014). 
80 Remarks by Howard Beales, Dir. of Consumer Protection, on Privacy Notices at the FTC 
Privacy Agenda, January 2002. Cited by Cranor, supra note 23 at 278. 
81 Cranor, supra note 23.  
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Notice is considered a non-technical issue, in contrast to secure 
handling of data or data minimization.  Stakeholders, including policy 
makers or lobbyists for technical companies, may be concerned that 
intervening in technical areas may stifle innovation. Calo describes 
notice as being an alternative to law, along with code and nudges. He 
posits that regulators may choose notice as they “do not need to 
undertake the difficult, costly, and politically challenging task of 
telling firms exactly how they should run their businesses.”82 We 
suggest that policy bodies turn to standards-setting bodies or consult 
with expert consultants for technical expertise. 
Transparency puts the responsibility on the consumer to reduce 
risk through his or her own decisions.  Notice is consonant with the 
principles of autonomy and beneficence, and these principles have 
guided several policy discussions, such as cigarette or pharmaceutical 
regulation.83 However, these principles have also been used to shift 
liability and responsibility from the industry to end consumers.84 
While this may work for well-known products and services where it is 
clear what people can do to prevent harm, it does not work well for 
things like apps in smartphones, as the mitigations available to users 
are not always clear.85  
Policy makers should recognize that the “easy” problem of 
transparency is not easy, and does not mitigate the major risks. Notice 
by itself does not guarantee user comprehension; notice without 
comprehension might lead to the habit of acknowledging information 
that is not even read. This problem is aggravated by the lack of formal 
training in privacy of most app developers, their lack of awareness of 
governmental guidelines concerning privacy and security, and their 
low appreciation of data minimization and privacy policies.86 Good 
 
 
 
 
82 RYAN CALO, CODE, NUDGE, OR NOTICE? (2013). 
83 David Egilman & Susana Rankin Bohme, A Brief History of Warnings, in HANDBOOK OF 
WARNINGS (Michael S. Wogalter ed., 2006). 
84 Susana Rankin Bohme & David Egilman, Consider the Source: Warnings and Anti-
Warnings in the Tobacco, Automobile, Beryllium, and Pharmaceutical Industries, in 
HANDBOOK OF WARNINGS (Michael S. Wogalter ed., 2006). 
85 Popescu et al. argue that lock-ins and exit costs in the mobile ecosystem prevent users 
from making choices to protect their privacy, and that even when opt-out mechanisms 
exist, they do not allow users to express their full range of preferences. Mihaela Popescu & 
Lemi Baruh, Captive But Mobile: Privacy Concerns and Remedies for the Mobile 
Environment, 29 INFO. SOC’Y 278, 278-282 (2013).   
 
86 Balebako supra note 68. 
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policy on data minimization may require expertise, and will require 
action by app developers and platforms. 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
By interviewing experts from many stakeholder groups, we were 
able to get a holistic perspective of the harms and concerns to users 
from smartphone data sharing, and how they can be mitigated.  The 
experts identified a number of harms from smartphone data sharing.  
These harms included tangible and direct harms such as financial 
harm and physical harms.  They also included less direct harms such 
as behavioral advertising and embarrassment.  In order for users to 
continue enjoying the benefits of smartphones, it is best to mitigate 
the risks of the harms.   
Experts identified a number of mitigations that users, platform 
developers, app developers, and regulators could implement.  We 
classified these mitigations as providing notice, control, security, or 
data minimization, and provided evidence as to how some of the most 
harmful problems cannot be addressed by notice alone.  The 
interventions that improve security and minimize data collection 
mitigate the most harmful risks, such as financial, physical, and social 
harms. 
By focusing only on Notice and Choice, existing policies fall short 
at addressing the problems identified by experts in our study. Most 
experts mentioned transparency as the main intervention for both app 
and platform developers; however, this is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition to protect users’ privacy.87 While notice may help 
to address social problems and those risks that are most readily 
identified as privacy-related, most harmful problems cannot be 
addressed by notice alone.  This is due partly to the flaws of notice 
(requiring user attention).  In other cases, increased control is needed 
for users to act on the notice. Finally, some harms stem from 
malicious parties who will deliberately circumvent user notice and 
control.  While notice and user education is a precondition for better 
control and better decisions by the user, the focus of future policy and 
efforts should include security, control and reduced access. We 
encourage app developers, platforms, and policy-makers to enlarge 
their efforts to include best security practices and data minimization. 
 
 
 
 
 
87 Cranor, supra note 23.  
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VIII. APPENDIX 
 
A. Interview Script 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. As you 
have read in the consent form, your participation is voluntary. All your 
responses will be kept anonymous. You may stop the interview at any 
time. We will be recording the audio of the interview for transcription. 
 
Do you have any questions about the process before we begin? 
I have turned on the audio recording. Please confirm you are 
ok with being recorded. 
 
 What is your professional title and industry? 
 
 Tell me a bit about your background and expertise. 
 
I’m doing research on the risks of data flowing from 
smartphones, with the end goal of designing better user interfaces so 
users can make informed decisions. In particular, I’m interested in the 
harms, risks, and privacy concerns that could occur from smartphone 
data sharing. I’d like your thoughts on how harms can occur and what 
the smartphone user can do to prevent them. I am also interested in 
privacy concerns, which may not involve physical or financial harm, 
but that a smartphone user would find uncomfortable or undesirable. 
I will be asking about what users can do or need to know to prevent 
harms and risks. If there is information they need but don’t currently 
have access to, please include that in your response. 
 
 How would you define data sharing from smartphones, in 
terms of what the data is and where it goes? 
 
 What harms could come to smartphone users from data 
sharing? [Expert should brainstorm list of harms] 
 
 To recap, you’ve mentioned the following harms 
[interviewer repeats harms mentioned]: 
 
I have some other harms that have been mentioned in research 
and by smartphone users. I’m mentioning these to help with 
brainstorming. 
Please feel free to add to this list or object to any items on the list. 
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 Malicious apps stealing financial information 
 
 Apps sharing location information leading to stalking 
 
 Business sharing their data sets that then becomes de-
anonymized 
 
 Data breach leading to financial harm or identity theft 
 
 Apps sharing behavioral information with social circles, 
leading to embarrassment or problems with friends and 
family 
 
 Un-encrypted data sent over a public network, leading to 
stealing of financial or sensitive information 
 
 Premium texting or downloading unwanted software 
 
 Do you have any more to add? 
 
  I’m interested in categorizing the harms into two lists: the most 
harmful and the most likely. Of all the harms we discussed, which are 
the most likely. 
 
 Which ones could cause the most damage or harm? 
 
 My mother just got a smartphone. What should she do and 
what does she need to know to prevent this harm? 
 
 How should the smartphone interface or OS change to 
protect her? 
 
 What should an app developer do to prevent the harms or 
concerns? 
 
 What should regulators or public policy be doing to 
mitigate the risks? [Question only asked explicitly of 
government stakeholder] 
 
 
 Are any of these harms or concerns different if children are 
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involved? 
 
 Are there any other vulnerable populations? 
 
 Looking forward 5-10 years, what will change when it 
comes to privacy and security? 
 
 That concludes my interview questions. What questions do 
you think I should have asked, or should ask future 
experts? 
 
 Is there anything else you would like to add 

